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rom a distance, the recent decision by Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi to resign after 
suffering a loss in a referendum on a proposed ambitious constitutional reform might look like 
another sign of the wave of populism and ‘anti-system’ sentiment that led to the Brexit vote in 
June and the election of Donald Trump as the new US President in November. A closer look, however, 
reveals that the Italian situation is more peculiar and should neither be assimilated to these earlier 
events, nor taken as an early warning of the possible rise of populist parties in upcoming elections in 
other European countries such as France, Germany and the Netherlands. Likewise, the results of the 
Austrian elections last weekend confirm that there seems to be no ‘Trump effect’ on Europe for now.  
Renzi himself emerged as a populist, anti-establishment leader 
Matteo Renzi emerged as a young, talented political leader after a quick political career as local 
administrator (2004-09) and mayor of Florence (2009-14). His rise occurred at the expense of the more 
established leadership within his own party and was accompanied by the clear intention to get rid of 
the existing political leadership. Renzi emerged almost as a ‘Trump’: not favoured by his own party’s 
established leaders, he gradually gained power by establishing transversal alliances with more 
conservative parties (including Berlusconi’s own party, with which the original idea of the 
constitutional reform was extensively discussed and agreed back in 2014) and creating the 
preconditions for a large coalition backing his government and sending home Enrico Letta, who had 
stepped in as prime minister only a few months before.  
Once in power, Renzi pursued some ambitious reforms by focusing mostly on speed and presenting 
himself as an agile and ‘liquid’ anti-establishment leader. His policies have since led him to part ways 
with many members of his own party, which ended up being split even in last Sunday’s vote. On the 
other hand, Renzi made inroads in the centrist and conservative parties, which form part of his 
coalition. He made a courageous bet – keeping a hybrid coalition behind him until the next elections 
in 2018 – but made more enemies than friends along the way. His leadership style soon has been seen 
as lacking openness and becoming gradually less democratic. He did not modernise Italian institutions 
from the inside (for example, by strengthening the transparency and evidence-based nature of the 
Italian policy process) but rather announced the intention to get rid of some of the checks and balances 
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that the Italian constitution contemplates, inevitably triggering an adversarial response; he did not 
pursue redistribution policies other than a couple of rather populist moves (e.g. a one-off contribution 
of €80 to people with low-income salaries); he chose the large employers’ side in many battles with 
workers’ unions, thereby creating fierce enemies in the left-wing; he courted Silvio Berlusconi and was 
courted by him, in an acrobatic ballet often fraught with narcissism; and they ended up falling into the 
same trap as has entangled many Italian governments: no sign of stronger investment in education 
and research, no sign of a true vision for the future of Italy in economic, social and environmental 
terms, no sign of better implementation of the many promised policy changes (including the ambitious 
and heavily contested “Jobs Act”). He surrounded himself with a group of newcomers, mostly coming 
from his own region (Tuscany), and displaying varying degrees of competence and communication 
abilities: some of them were closer to the right-wing than to the Democratic party, and some of them 
were implicated in scandals early on.  
Renzi showed a lot of courage when he decided to champion the constitutional reform he had 
discussed with Silvio Berlusconi, and probably also with international investors, and did all he could to 
‘personalise’ the referendum, by transforming it into a plebiscite on his personal leadership. In the past 
few weeks, courage turned into desperation, and Renzi seemed 
willing to conquer the electorate with resounding promises (a not-
so-new commitment to build a bridge between Sicily and Calabria, 
a generous monthly salary increase of €85 for civil servants, etc.); 
and pushed himself way beyond the limits allowed by EU Treaties in 
presenting a budget law that will have to be significantly amended 
(not now, but in March 2017, as the Eurogroup just announced).  
The proposed reform was populist and presented as anti-establishment 
The weeks that preceded the vote were characterised by a lot of turmoil in the Italian political debate, 
as usually occurs in the country. This time, however, a number of academics denounced the lack of 
clarity and the biased formulation of the question citizens were called to answer. The text asked “Do 
you approve the text of the Constitutional Law concerning 'Provisions for overcoming equal 
bicameralism, reducing the number of Members of Parliament, limiting the operating costs of the 
institutions, the suppression of the CNEL and the revision of Title V of Part II of the Constitution' 
approved by Parliament and published in the Official Gazette no. 88 of 15 April 2016?” It asked citizens 
to provide through a “yes/no” answer an assessment of a very complex law, and mostly highlighting 
the cost-reduction potential of the proposed reform rather than its impact on the democratic 
legitimacy of the institutional framework. Authoritative experts raised concerns on the potential anti-
democratic impact of the proposed reform, fearing that the reform would weaken all the constitutional 
safeguards against the consolidation of power in the hands of the executive, a distinctive trait of Italy’s 
post- (and anti-)fascist constitution. In other words, several experts rejected the proposed referendum 
as coming close to an attempted golpe. 
After all, a non-elected government had relied on a partly illegitimate parliament (elected with an 
electoral law then declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court) to propose one of the most 
profound reforms of the Italian Constitution since the 1970s. And while the opponents included 
extreme right parties, ‘direct democracy’ advocates and old, marginalised political leaders from many 
political parties, an analysis of the vote reveals that it was mostly the younger generation, and even 
more the South of the country, that decided to send Renzi home. As much as 81% of the voters aged 
18-34 voted against the proposed reform, and this is way above the large share of followers currently 
It was a brave move to run this risk, 
but in hindsight not a clever one, since 
Italians – especially among the young 
– interpreted it as an attempt to 
hijack the popular vote. 
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attributed to the Five Star movement. More generally, an analysis of the vote published by the 
Financial Times reveals that the proposed reform was also rejected in areas where Renzi’s own party 
had fared relatively well in past elections. Contrary to what happened in the Brexit vote, young voters 
in Italy opposed the young reformer, who suddenly became in their eyes part and parcel of the ancien 
regime and tainted by a thirst for unconstrained power. And even if Renzi himself vibrantly proclaimed 
that voting yes was the only choice against the establishment, he did not convince many, and suffered 
a severe defeat probably due to the low credibility he had earned in 1,015 days of government.  
The consequences for Europe should not be exaggerated  
Italy is still a solid country, and the result of the referendum should be taken as an evidence that the 
Bel Paese is still able to decide for itself. That said, the President of the Republic shall now appoint a 
transition government led by an institutional figure. This is not necessarily a bad idea: paradoxically, in 
Italy, transition governments often take a more pragmatic stance than a political one. And Renzi’s own 
government was not elected, nor was it backed by a well-defined, compact political coalition with a 
shared set of values and policy goals. Besides approving the budget law for 2017 (immediately, and 
under Renzi’s interim leadership), the government will certainly have to face immediate policy 
challenges in the credit sector (with some banks like MPS being very close to the bail-out zone); and 
will approve a new electoral law especially for the Senate, which survived a severe risk of institutional 
downgrading and power dilution. In late January the Constitutional Court will decide on the viability of 
the current voting system for the House of Representatives; meanwhile, two completely different 
voting systems apply to the two Houses, potentially leading to further instability in future elections.  
Once the government is formed, it will also become clearer if the prospects are to go back to the ballot 
in 2017, or wait until 2018. Current Members of Parliament might opt for the latter in order to acquire 
the right to a lifelong pension; and political uncertainty might in any event lead the President of the 
Republic to opt for such a solution in order to avoid a major reaction of financial markets. Whatever 
the solution, the real risk is the limbo that reigns in the country, with its enduring lack of leadership in 
the traditional political parties, the looming shadow of Berlusconi’s (partial) return, and the relative 
lack of preparedness of the emerging parties like the Five Star movement, which rely on a too limited 
spectrum of political proposals that still undermines their credibility as future country leaders (which 
they might well end up being). Still, until a strong government is formed and democratic legitimacy is 
restored, the country will remain incapable of addressing its most evident weaknesses: stagnant 
productivity, growing inequality (29% of the population are at risk of poverty according to recent data), 
poor infrastructure and lacklustre prospects in terms of skills and entrepreneurship (with Italy in the 
lowest positions among OECD countries for both PISA numeracy and literacy scores); and of course a 
public debt that overburdens the economy and the government’s room to manoeuvre. Until then, Italy 
is doomed to remain the ‘sick man’ in an already ‘sick Europe’.  
In the coming months, the country will have to appoint a 
productivity board in charge of exactly this goal: an ambitious 
regulatory governance and reform are currently among the 
most urgent but most-often ignored steps in Italy. Whoever 
embraces this challenge in earnest will benefit the country in 
the long term: whether that is Renzi himself, or the deeply 
feared (by EU leaders) Five Star Movement, accused of being 
Euro-sceptic and possibly (but not certainly) willing to call a referendum on Italy’s Eurozone 
membership. 
Navigating the road towards a stronger Italy 
in a stronger Europe is a complicated but not 
impossible task, and it may require a 
strengthening of Italy’s institutions at all 
levels of government and a stronger ability 
to deliver on policy implementation, 
evaluation and enforcement. 
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As of now, uncertainty reigns. And even the Five Star Movement does not seem to go beyond a 
“constructive Euro-scepticism”, coupled with a minimalist domestic policy agenda. But have a quick 
look at what is happening around Europe, and in particular in the UK, Hungary, Poland and the 
Mediterranean: Should one really be that surprised and scared by the mounting scepticism on the 
current effectiveness and legitimacy of EU institutions? 
